Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 13 | Issue 2

Article 4

1922

Cross-Examination of the Alienist
John E. Lind

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
John E. Lind, Cross-Examination of the Alienist, 13 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 228 (May 1922 to February 1923)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

T~HE CIROSS-EXAMINATION OF ThE

ALIENIST'

JOHN E. LIND, M. D.1

The expert in mental disorder is brought into court for a very
definite purpose, which is either-depending upon which side calls
him-to testify to the responsibility or irresponsibility of a certain person. I shall discuss in this article more particularly the alienist in
murder trials. In these the burden of proof rests on the defense. The
defendant is presumed sane by the law and to overthrow this assumption his attorneys bring experts in mental disorders into court to testify
that he is not responsible. This testimony having been offered, the
prosecution combats it either by offering experts of their own to testify
to the contrary or by merely refusing to offer any testimony in rebuttal
and claiming that the alleged insanity has not been proved.
When considering at all the question of irresponsibility as is affects
criminal law, one is tempted to dilate upon many aspects of it, to consider indeed the whole question of responsibility, the trial of mental
status by lay juries, the hiring of experts, the method of testifying,
and many other points of interest. The scope of this paper will not be
so extensive, however, for several reasons. For one thing, it is the
writer's opinion that a fair constructive criticism of the present system'
could only be made by the collaboration of a jurist versed in medical
matters with an alienist experienced in the law. Such comment as the
writer might be able to offer would only be destructive in nature, would
no doubt 'be unjust in that it would not be informed by comprehensive
knowledge and would not have constructive suggestions to offer.
It is, therefore, in no spirit of reform or uplift that the writer
ventures to present a few impressions, arduously sweated from him in
the hot-box known as the witness-stand, exposed to the fierce light of
public scrutiny, bathed in the sun of the judge's legal knowledge and
subjected to the fire of the opposing lawyer.
It is thought these might serve to show how easily the psychiatrist,
testifying in a murder trial, may be put in a false position, how difficult it is for him to present his conception of the case to the jury, how
skilfully his statements may be emasculated by cross-examination; it
may perhaps serve to explain why he goes on the stand, feeling that he
'Read before the Washintgon Society for Nervous and Mental Disease,
May 19, 1921.
'Senior Assistant Physician, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C.
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is testifying in behalf of an irresponsible unfortunate whose mental
condition should be taken into account in dealing with him, and leaves
the stand wondering whether he has not helped to tighten the noose
about his neck.
The first point the writer wishes to touch upon is the danger of
bias. The picture which the general public usually forms of insanity
as a defense in a murder trial is a series or bewhiskered experts solemnly testifying that the accused is insane, followed by a series of
equally hirsute and learned men testifying that he is sane. The natural
reaction of the layman is to discount the whole business and no doubt
this is what practically happens in the case of many juries. They say
among themselves, "Well, three doctors have testified on one side and
three on the other. We don't know which to believe. Let's throw this
whole insanity business out. The man doesn't look very crazy to us,
anyhow." The result is, of course-a man being presumed sane by the
law-that the accused loses all the benefit of a doubt as to his mental
condition.
Under our present system, it is practically impossible for the most
honest alienist to avoid leaning one way or the other. He stands after
all in the delicate relation of employed to employer. The lawyer seeks
him out especially, thus gratifying his amour propre, flatters him by
telling of his side's dependence upon him for the strength of the case
and finally he pays a good fee for his services. The alienist thus comes
into court with a friendly feeling towards the lawyers for the defense
together with a sympathy for the accused and it is small wonder that
when attacked by the prosecuting attorney he is inclined to make
doubtful statements emphatic and strong ones even stronger. Even
those overly conscientious men who fear lest they might be unconsciously prejudiced sometimes show bias in that they may lean too far
the other way, which is just as bad. Worse in fact.
However, let us assume that our protagonist has gotten on the
witness-stand and, led on by the sympathetic and admiring attitude of
the counsel for the defense, has stated his opinion that the accused was
of unsound mind at the time the crime was committed. He is then
delivered over into the hands of the prosecution.
The scene which follows next is one familiar in all criminal courts.
There is the endless wrangling over small points, the endeavor to trap
the witness into a contradiction or an admission, the quarrels over
definitiots, the citations of authority, etc., etc.
The effort of the cross-examination-as the writer has observed it
from the less desirable side of the witness-box-seems to be divided
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into two main parts, to discredit the witness and to vitiate his testimony.
The attempt to discredit the expert witness personally is often done
only indirectly, but he may be the object of dir.ect attacks under which
it is rather difficult to retain one's equanimity. For example, a doctor
who had had some experience in mental disorder was a prisoner himself and was called to testify in behalf of the defendant. The prosecutor brought the fact that the doctor himself was a prisoner before
the jury by such questions as "Did you occupy the same cell at the jail
with the accused ?" or "Did you observe the accused when you rode up
from the jail in the wagon with him this morning?"
Of course, in the instance cited, the attorney for the defense immediately objected to each question on the ground that it brought indirectly before the jury facts that could not be presented to it directly.
This objection was sustained, but the jury became aware that the witness was in bad odor with the community himself, which was, after all,
what the prosecutibn wanted.
The alienist's motives may be brought into question by asking him
whether he has been paid for testifying or not and whether he is to get
a larger sum if the defendant is acquitted than if he is convicted. (The
medical expert, I may remark, parenthetically, should never agree to a
contingent fee.)
Or the medical expert may be attacked on the professional side by
intimating that his qualifications, which were brought out so grandiloquently by the other side, are not so very much after all. Thus, should
he be on the staff of a hospital for mental disorder, the cross-examiner
may enlarge upon the fact that he is only second, or third, or fourth on
the staff. This he is especially likely to do if, as sometimes happens,
one of his own experts should be a member of the same staff and hold
a technically higher rating.
The cross-examiner may attempt the direct way of discrediting the
alienist's professional attainments by questioning him along the line of
his specialty, but this is rather dangerous business, unless the lawyer is
especial'y conversant with psychiatry or the alienist is especially incompetent. The witness saw one physician attempt to qualify as an expert
in mental and nervous diseases and when asked to tell what a neuron
was and give the number of cranial nerves was unable to do either.
A method more usual is to produce various text-books in court
and ask the witness if he is familiar with them.
He should beware
how he admits that any one of them is an authority lest a statement be
immediately quoted from it opposed to one he himself has made. The
writer heard one exasperated expert declare that hereafter if he has
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read a text-book cited he will say it, is good, but not an authority, but
if he has not read it, he will say it is not much good anyway. Or a
prosecuting attorney may try to get the witness to answer metaphysical
questions, as one asked each opposing expert: "What is the first principle of human knowledge?" and if the doctor said he didn't know,
would say, "What, doctor, you claim to be a scientific man and admit
you can't tell the first principle of human knowledge."
Other ways of discrediting the witness are by endeavoring to show
that he has not devoted sufficient time-to the examination of the accused
to form an opinion, that he has neglected to make a physical examination, that he saw him too long after the crime itself, and so on.
These do not exhause the possibilities, but we shall pass on to the
attack on the testimony itself. This is made in various ways which we
shall endeavor to touch upon at least.
First, let me allude to written memoranda. My own method is to
make very few notes at the time I examine a prisoner, noting down
briefly only the outstanding symptoms and relying on my memory for
my testimony. Many psychiatrists, however, are more meticulous and
make detailed notes to which they are prone to refer in court. This
always leads to the prosecutor objecting to the consultation of the
notes, except to "refresh the memory." If the memory requires too
much refreshment, the witness is subject to sarcastic comment. I have
seen a lawyer give his own witness opportunity to refer frequently to
his notes in the following manner: He would allow him to testify as
much as he could from memory and then, when he saw him hesitate,
would ask some such question as, "What did his brother-in-law say ?"
The doctor would not be able to recall without looking at his notes
and was advised to "refresh his memory." After looking carefully
through several pages of notes, he would say, "Nothing," and continue his testimony with his memory much refreshed apparently.
It seems to the writer that the chief reason for the poor showing
which the alienist makes on the witness-stand and for the tremendous
advantage which the cross-examiner has over him is in the fact that
medicine is not an exact science itself, especially that branch dealing
with mental disorder, but the testimony of the witness is attacked as if
the points he made were as susceptible of exact proof as a mathematical demonstration.
It is well known, e. g., that even in the chronic insane many acts
are not irrational as such. Thus a patient with marked grandiose and
persecutory delusions may yet go to. his meals, dress and undress him-
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self, play games, etc. Suppose the doctor to be cross-examined about
such a patient, we might suppose the district attorney to ask:
"You say So-and-So is insane; now, isn't it a fact that he dresses
himself neatly every morning? He doesn't put his trousers on his
arms and his coat on his legs, does he, doctor? When it is meal time
he goes to the dining-room, he doesn't go to the sitting-room, does
he ?" etc.

Again, the prosecutor may ask you what "pathology" you have
found, especially if you have defined insanity as a disease of the brain.
He will ask you if there can be any disease without a pathological
process, if you have found any pathological process; if you have not
he will ask you how you can say insanity exists if you have found no
disease of the brain.
The most common attack in cross-examination is by attacking
individually each symptom quoted by the doctor in giving his reason
for thinking the accused of unsound mind. This is quite effective and
exasperating, its effectiveness lying in the fact that mental disorder is,
speaking broadly, not demonstrable in any examination of the patient
at one time, nor in any single act committed by him, but in a broad
view of his conduct over a certain period of time or in the circumstances and setting, say, of his criminal act.
In other words, the conclusion to which an alienist comes, especially when his opinion is based on a hypothetical question, is after all
the result of a process of inductive reasoning which automatically lays
itself open to the attack that all the facts were not known.
The doctrine of probability, too, which lends strength to the opinion, is not available when the symptoms are taken up singly. Thus
the prosecuting attorney may take a single act, quoted by the alienist,
out of its setting and force the physician to admit that of itself it is
not necessarily an insane act or a symptom of insanity. Then he may
say: "In other words, doctor, you have admitted that this is not a
symptom of insanity; in other words, that it means nothing. Now, one
thousand times nothing is still nothing, isn't it?" Which is perfectly
true, mathematically speaking, but in medicine the whole is sometimes
greater than the sum of all its parts. What is not brought before the
jury is that a man may perform one bizarre action and still be sane; if
he does two, we think of mental disorder, three or four still more so
and with every additional symptom the probability increases in geometrical proportion, so that we feel justified in giving an opinion of
unsoundness of mind based on a series of abnormal actions, while we
cannot swear that each act taken .by itself is evidence of insanity, or,
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as it is frequently put, "Would it be possible for a person of sound
mind to do it

"

Speaking of abnormality reminds me of the trap of definition into
which I earnestly adjure psychiatrists not to fall. Thus at one trial
several hundred people wasted one golden hour, set with sixty diamond
seconds-as the copy books used to say-trying to get an expert to
define a normal person, which he held, very properly, was impossible.
Of course, the crux of the legal situation is, after all, whether or
not the defendant knows right from wrong and when the physician
has replied in the negative he is liable to be bombarded with questions
tending to show that the defendant attempted escape or concealment
after his crime. Thus the mere automatic flight after a murder and
the instinctive avoidance of people are held to be evidences of the
existence of a realization of guilt.
Having once gotten the physician to say the accused was irresponsible on the day of his crime, the prosecutor naturally quotes various
things he did in a perfectly rational manner on that day, including
perhaps the preliminaries of the crime itself. Thus, if the accused
picked up a4 iron bar, he will ask, "Doctor, when the accused picked
up an iron bar, did he know it was iron?" "When he struck his victim,
did he know he had killed him ?" "Was picking up an iron bar and
not a lead pencil evidence of sanity or insanity?" etc. If the doctor
states he does not know what was in the accused's mind he is met
with "Why, doctor, how can you come into court here and pretend to
tell this jury what was the state of the mind of the defendant when
you admit you don't know it?"
Another method of attack, used especially where the diagnosis has
been based partly at least on the accused's own story, is to ask:
"Doctor, did you believe So-and-So when he told you that?"
If you say you did believe him, he will say, "Now, doctor, the
accused knew he was in danger of his life. Do you think that would
make any difference in his story ?" or "Doctor, you say you knew he
was insane and yet you believed everything he told you. Do you always
believe everything an insane person tells you?"
If the physician says he did not believe everything, but only parts
of his story, the prosecutor says, "Oh, you pick out the parts you want
to believe and reject the rest, do you?"
In this connection, the witness is of course asked how he knows
the accused is not malingering, or how far the replies were suggested
by his questions. If the accused contradicts himself in the course of
two examinations the doctor is asked which he believes and why. If
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he recalls something at the second examination he could not at the first
he is asked if his memory is better then. or if he has only made up a
new lie.
Time will not permit of the discussion of hypothetical questions,
but they are of course attacked by dropping each part of them in turn
and saying, "Now, suppose we leave that out, would that affect your
opinion ?" The unwary witness may thus see four or five of his symptoms dropped and then become uneasy at their dwindling, say when it
is suggested that the next symptom be elided, that he would then
change his opinion. This gives the cross-examiner his opportunity.
He says, "In other words, you wouldn't call him insane without this
symptom (or act), but you would with it?" This focuses an undue
attention on this particular symptom and it is attacked intensively, with
the result that if the witness is obliged to admit that it is not in itself
indicative of insanity it seems to the jury as if he had abandoned the
one thing he emphasized.
The counter-hypothetical question is of course constructed by
leaving out parts of the hypothetical question which the prosecutor
believes he can disprove, by putting in acts showing no,, abnormality
and by giving motives for acts which seem purposeless in the hypothetical question. The chief defense against this is to say that the question does not give enough material to form an opinion on, just as the
physician should say, when questioned about the meaning of a certain
act quoted by the prosecutor to show rationality, that it does not of
itself indicate either sanity or insanity. The physician will be forced
to admit probably that he cannot diagnose insanity from the counterhypothetical question. This, as will be seen, puts the matter in a false
light. The jury is only allowed to see certain acts and statements or
selected parts of a life history and are told that the eminent alienist
can find nothing in them. to indicate insanity. In other words, the insane person in a day may do ninety things which are not unusual or
eccentric, but the sane person does not commit ten absurd actions in
a day.
As suggested above, there are many aspects of the matter which
are here omitted. Other subjects open too wide a field of speculation,
e. g., the question as to whether or not there should be a doctrine of
partial responsibility. However, I have only given some high lights
which may be of reminiscent interest to those who have been through
the mill and serve as danger signals to those who seek experiences of
this sort under the impression that alienists receive 'big fees for a little
pleasant work.

